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Abstract¡ In this paper, we analyze four authentication protocols 
of Bindu et al., Goriparthi et al., Wang et al. and Holbl et al.. 
After investigation, we reveal several weaknesses of these 
schemes. First, Bindu et al.¡s protocol suffers from an insider 
impersonation attack if a malicious user obtains a lost smart card. 
Second, both Goriparthi et al.¡s and Wang et al.¡s protocols 
cannot withstand a DoS attack in the password change phase, i.e. 
an attacker can involve the phase to make user¡s password never 
be used in subsequent authentications. Third, Holbl et al.¡s 
protocol is vulnerable to an insider attack since a legal but 
malevolent user can deduce KGC¡s secret key.  
Keywords- password authentication protocol; insider attack; 
denial-of-service attack; smart card lost problem; mutual 
authentication; man-in-the-middle attack 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Authentication protocols provide two entities to ensure that 
the counterparty is the intended one whom he attempts to 
communicate with over an insecure network. These protocols 
can be considered from three dimensions: type, efficiency and 
security.  
In general, there are two types of authentication protocols, 
the password-based and the public-key based. In a password-
based protocol, a user registers his account and password to a 
remote server. Later, he can access the remote server if he can 
prove his knowledge of the password. The server usually 
maintains a password or verification table but this will make 
the system easily subjected to a stolen-verifier attack. To 
address this problem, recent studies suggest an approach 
without any password or verification table in the server. 
Moreover, to enhance password protection, recent studies also 
introduce a tamper-resistant smart card in the user end. In a 
public key-based system, a user should register himself to a 
trust party, named KGC (Key Generation Center) to obtain his 
public key and corresponding private key. Then, they can be 
recognized by a network entity through his public key. To 
simplify the key management, an identity-based public-key 
cryptosystem is usually adopted, in which KGC issues user¡s 
ID as public key and computes corresponding private key for a 
user.  
Considering computational efficiency in an authentication 
protocol, researchers employs low computational techniques 
such as secure one-way hash functions or symmetric key 
encryptions rather than much expensive computation like 
asymmetric key encryptions (i.e., RSA, ECC, ElGamal, and 
bilinear pairings). As considering communication efficiency, it 
usually to reduce the number of passes (rounds) of a protocol 
since the round efficiency is more significant than the 
computation efficiency. 
The most important dimension of an authentication 
protocol is its security, and it should ensure secure 
communications for any two legal entities over an insecure 
network. Attackers easily eavesdrop, modify or intercept the 
communication messages on the open network. Hence, an 
authentication protocol should withstand various attacks, such 
as password guessing attack, replay attack, impersonation 
attack, insider attack, and man-in-the-middle attack.  
In recent decade, many secure authentication protocols [1-
41] were proposed. In 2008, Bindu et al. [14] proposed an 
improvement from Chien and Chen¡s work [3]. Their protocol 
is a smart-card based password authentication protocol and 
employs symmetric key cryptosystem. They claimed that their 
protocol is secure, provides user anonymity, and prevent from 
various attacks: replay attack, stolen-verifier attack, password 
guessing attack, insider attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. 
In 2009, Goriparthi et al. proposed a scheme [27] based on 
Das et al.¡s protocol [2] and can avoid the weakness existing 
in Chou et al.¡s [5]. Goriparthi et al.¡s protocol is also a smart 
card based password authentication protocol and bases on 
bilinear pairings. They claimed that their protocol is secure 
and can withstand replay attack and insider attack. In the same 
year, Wang et al. [31] also proposed an improvement based on 
Das et al.¡s protocol [2]. Their scheme is a smart card based 
password authentication protocol as well and uses secure one-
way hash function. Also in 2009, Holbl et al. [40] improved 
from two identity-based authentication protocols, Hsieh et al. 
[1] and Tseng et al. [8]. Their protocols are neither password-
based nor smart card based protocols. They employ identity-
based ElGamal cryptosystem. Although all of the above 
schemes claimed that they are secure; however, in this paper, 
we will demonstrate some security vulnerabilities of these 
protocol in Bindu et al.¡s [14], Goriparthi et al.¡s [27], Wang et 
al.¡s [31], and Holbl et al.¡s work, correspondingly. 
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II. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON BINDU ET AL.'S PROTOCOL  
In this section, we first review Bindu et al.¡s protocol[14] 
and then show an insider attack launched by an insider who is 
supposed to have obtained another legal user¡s smart card. 
A. Review 
There are three phases in Bindu et al.¡s protocol: the 
registration phase, the login phase, and the authentication 
phase. 
In the registration phase, server S issues to user i a smart 
card which contains mi and Ii, where mi=H(IDi⊕s)⊕H(s)⊕
H(PWi), Ii=H(IDi⊕s)⊕s, and s is S¡s secret key. 
When i wants to login to S, he starts the login phase and 
computes ri=gx (x is a random number chosen by i), M=mi⊕
H(PWi), U=M⊕ri, R=Ii⊕ri= H(IDi⊕s)⊕s⊕ri, and ER[ri, IDi, 
T] (T is a timestamp, and ER[ri, IDi, T] is a ciphertext 
encrypted by the secret key R). He then sends {U, T, ER[ri, IDi, 
T]} to S. 
In the authentication phase, after receiving {U, T, ER[ri, IDi, 
T]} at time Ts, S computes R= U⊕H(s)⊕s =M⊕ri⊕H(s)⊕s 
=mi⊕H(PWi)⊕ri⊕H(s)⊕s = H(IDi⊕s)⊕H(s)⊕H(PWi)⊕
H(PWi)⊕ri⊕H(s)⊕s = H(IDi⊕s)⊕ri⊕s, decrypts ER[ri, IDi, 
T], checks to see if Ts−T is less than ∆T, and compares R with 
H(IDi⊕s)⊕s⊕ri to see if they are equal. If they are, he sends 
{Ts, ER[rs, ri+1, Ts]} to i, where rs=gy and y is a random 
number chosen by S. After that, i verifies the validity of the 
timestamp Ts, decrypts ER[rs, ri+1, Ts], and checks to see if 
ri+1 is correct or not. If it is, S is authentic. Then, i sends 
{EKus[rs+1]} to S, where Kus=rsx=gxy. Finally, S decrypts the 
received message {EKus[rs+1]} and checks to see if the value 
of rs+1 is correct or not. If it is, i is authentic. 
B. Attack 
If C lost his smart card and the card is got by an insider E, 
E can impersonate C to log into S. We show the attack in the 
following. 
For that C¡s smart card stores mc=H(IDc⊕ s)⊕H(s)⊕
H(PWc) and Ic=H(IDc⊕ s)⊕ s, and E¡s smart card stores 
me=H(IDe⊕s)⊕H(s)⊕H(PWe) and Ie=H(IDe⊕s)⊕s, suppose 
E gets C¡s smart card but doesn¡t have the knowledge of PWc, 
E can choose a random number x and computes rc=gx, V= me
⊕Ie⊕H(PWe)=H(s)⊕s, M=Ic⊕V= H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕H(s)⊕s 
=H(IDc⊕s)⊕H(s) which equals mc⊕H(PWc), U=M⊕rc, and 
R= Ic⊕rc. Then, E masquerades as C by sending {U, T, ER[rc, 
IDc, T]} to S. After receiving the message, S computes R=U⊕
H(s)⊕s and compares R with H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕rc. If they are 
equal, S sends C the message {Ts, ER[rs, rc+1, Ts]}. E 
intercepts the message, decrypts ER[rs, rc+1, Ts], and uses rs to 
compute Kus=rsx=gxy. E then can send a correct message 
{EKus[rs+1]} to S, to let S authenticate him as C. In other 
words, insider E can successfully launch an insider attack if 
the user¡s smart card is lost. 
More clarity, we demonstrate why R=U⊕H(s)⊕s is equal 
to H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕rc by the following equations. 
R=U⊕H(s)⊕s  
= M⊕rc⊕H(s)⊕s  (∵ U=M⊕rc) 
= Ic⊕V⊕rc⊕H(s)⊕s  (∵ M=Ic⊕V) 
= H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕V⊕rc⊕H(s)⊕s (∵ Ic=H(IDc⊕s)⊕s) 
= H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕H(s)⊕s⊕rc⊕H(s)⊕s (∵ V=H(s)⊕s) 
= H(IDc⊕s)⊕s⊕rc 
 
III. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON GORIPARTHI ET AL.'S 
PROTOCOL 
In this section, we first review Goriparthi et al.¡s scheme 
[27] and then demonstrate a DoS attack on the password 
change phase of the protocol, which will make user¡s 
password never be used in subsequent authentications. 
A. Review 
In the password change phase of Goriparthi et al.¡s 
protocol, when client C wants to change his password PW, he 
keys his ID and PW to his smart card. According their protocol, 
the smart card only checks ID while no mechanism to verify 
the validity of PW. If the ID is matched with the one stored in 
the smart card, the smart card will continuously ask C a new 
password PW*, and then compute Reg*ID = RegID ¡  h(PW) + 
h(PW*) = s¡h(ID) + h(PW*), where RegID = s¡h(ID) + h(PW) is 
issued by the server and stored in C¡s smart card in the 
registration phase, h(¡) is a map-to-point hash function, 
h:{0,1}*→G1, and G1 is a group on an elliptic curve. Finally, 
the smart card will replace RegID with Reg*ID. 
B. Attack 
In the protocol, assume that an attacker temporarily gets 
C¡s smart card. He arbitrarily selects two passwords PW' and 
PW'' as the old and the new ones, respectively. The smart card 
will then compute Reg'ID = RegID ¡  h(PW') + h(PW'') = s¡h(ID) 
+ h(PW) ¡  h(PW') + h(PW'') and replace RegID with Reg'ID. 
This will make C¡s original password PW never be used in 
subsequent authentications and thus cause denial of service. 
IV. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF WANG ET 
AL.¡S PROTOCOL 
In this section, we first review Wang et al.¡s protocol [31] 
and then show the protocol has the same weakness ¡  it suffers 
a  DOS attack in password change phase ¡  like Goriparthi et 
al.¡s work [27]. 
A. Review 
In Wang et al.¡s protocol , C inserts his smart card, keys 
PW, and requests to change the password PW to a new one 
PW*. On receiving the request, the smart card computes Ni* = 
Ni⊕H(PW)⊕H(PW*) and replaces Ni with Ni*, where Ni = 
H(PWi)⊕H(x) is stored in C¡s smart card, PWi is chosen by 
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the user when he registers himself to the remote server S, and 
x is S¡s secret key.. 
B. Attack 
Obviously, this protocol also exits the same weakness like 
Goriparthi et al.¡s work [27]. Since if an attacker temporarily 
gets C¡s smart card, he can use two arbitrary values PW' and 
PW'' to ask the smart card to update its storage through 
password change protocol. The smart card will compute Ni' = 
Ni⊕H(PW')⊕H(PW'') and replace Ni with Ni'. From then on, 
client C can never pass the subsequent authentications. 
V. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF HOLBL ET 
AL.'S PROTOCOL 
Holbl et al. [40] proposed two improvements of two-party 
key agreement and authentication protocols. In the following, 
we first briefly review their schemes and then present their 
weaknesses. 
A. Review of Holbl et al.¡s First Protocol 
Holbl et al.¡s first protocol consists of three phases: the 
system setup phase, the private key extraction phase, and the 
key agreement phase. 
In the system setup phase, KGC chooses a random number 
xs and keeps it secret. He computes ys=gxs as public key. 
In the private key extraction phase, for each user who has 
identity IDi, KGC selects a random number ki, and calculates 
his private key vi = Iiki + xsui (mod p¡ 1) and corresponding 
public key ui = gki (mod p), where Ii = H(IDi). 
In the key agreement phase, user A chooses a random 
number ra, computes ta = gra, and then sends {ua, ta, IDa} to 
user B. After receiving {ua, ta, IDa}, B chooses a random 
number rb, calculates tb = grb, and then sends {ub, tb, IDb} back 
to A. Finally, A and B can respectively compute their common 
session key, KAB = (ubIb.ysub.tb)(va+ra) = g(vb+rb)
.(va+ra) and KBA 
= (uaIa.ysua.ta)(vb+rb) = g(va+ra)
.(vb+rb), where Ia = H(IDa) and Ib 
= H(IDb). 
B. Attack on Holbl et al.¡s first protocol 
Assume that an insider C calculates Ic = H(IDc) and q = 
gcd(Ic, uc), and computes w = Ic/q, z = uc/q, and j = vc/q, where 
vc is C¡s private key. Hence, gcd(w, z) = 1. Then, he can use 
the extended Euclid¡s algorithm to find α and β both satisfying 
that α¡w + β¡z = 1. As a result, he can obtain both xs and kc, 
since vc = 1¡jc¡qc = (α¡w + β¡z)¡jc¡qc = (α¡Ic/q + β¡uc/q)¡j¡q = (α¡Ic 
+ β¡uc)¡j = Ic¡(α¡j) + (β¡j)¡uc and vc = Ic¡kc + xs¡uc, where xs is 
KGC¡s secret key and kc is a random number selected by KGC 
satisfying uc = gkc. More clearly, the value xs he obtains is 
equal to β¡j. 
After obtaining xs, C can deduce any user¡s private key in 
the same manner. As an example, in the following, we 
demonstrate how C can deduces user i¡s private key, ki. C 
calculates Ii = H(IDi) and qi = gcd(Ii, ui), computes wi = Ii /qi 
and zi = ui /qi, and then uses the extended Euclid¡s algorithm to 
compute γ and ε satisfying that γ¡wi + ε¡zi = 1. Finally, since vi 
= 1¡ji¡qi = (γ¡wi + ε¡zi)¡ji¡qi = (γ¡Ii/qi + ε¡ui/qi).ji¡qi = (γ¡Ii+ε¡ui)¡ji = 
Ii¡(γ¡ji) + (ε¡ji)¡ui and vi = Ii¡ki + xs¡ui, he can calculate ji = xs/ε 
and thus obtains i¡s private key by computing vi =.ji¡qi. With 
the knowledge of i¡s private key, insider C can impersonate 
user i to communicate with any other legal user.  
C. Review of Holbl et al.¡s second protocol 
Holbl et al.¡s second protocol consists of three phases: the 
system setup phase, the private key extraction phase, and the 
key agreement phase. 
The system setup phase of this protocol is the same as the 
one in the first protocol. 
In the private key extraction phase, with each user having 
his identity ID, KGC selects a random number ki, and 
calculates i¡s private key vi = ki + xs¡H(IDi, ui) and public key 
ui = gki . 
In the key agreement phase, user A chooses a random 
number ra, computes ta= gra, and then sends {ua, ta, IDa} to 
user B. After receiving {ua, ta, IDa}, B chooses a random 
number rb, calculates tb = grb, and then sends {ub, tb, IDb} to A. 
Finally, A and B can compute their common session key, KAB 
= (ub¡ysH(IDb,ub).tb)(va+ra) = g(vb+rb)(va+ra) and KBA = 
(ua¡ysH(IDa,ua)¡ta)(vb+rb) = g(va+ra)(vb+rb), respectively. 
D. Attack on Holbl et al.¡s secondprotocol 
Likewise, we can launch the same attack, as do in the first 
one, on this scheme. Since gcd(1, H(IDc, uc)) = 1, an insider C 
can use the extended Euclid¡s algorithm to find α and β both 
satisfying that α¡1 + β¡H(IDc, uc) = 1. And since vc = kc + 
xs¡H(IDc, uc) and 1 = (kc/vc)¡1 + (xs/vc)¡H(IDc, uc), he can obtain 
both xs and kc by letting xs = β¡vc and kc = α¡vc , where vc is C¡s 
private key, xs is KGC¡s secret key and kc is a random number 
selected by KGC satisfying uc = gkc. Consequently, similar to 
the result as shown in the attack of the first protocol, insider C 
can impersonate user i to communicate with any other legal 
user.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In the paper we have investigate four authentication 
protocols. In Bindu et al.¡s scheme [14], an insider can employ 
his own secrecy in the smart card issued from the server to 
successfully impersonate another user by getting the victim¡s 
smart card. In both Goriparthi et al.¡s and Wang et al.¡s 
schemes, their password change phases are easily subjected to 
a DOS attack, because no proper mechanism to verify user¡s 
input password. Finally, in Holbl et al.¡s scheme, any legal 
user can extract KGC¡s private key. 
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